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Do We Need a New Conception of Authorship? 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh* 
Thank you to the organizers for having me.  I’m delighted to be here.  I’m going 
to take a step away from conceptual art, and go a little bit into history and a little bit 
into doctrine—and do the usual law professor thing.  We law professors like to say 
that one of the great things about the job is that we get to overrule the Supreme Court 
ten thousand times a day, but the bad thing about the job is no one cares.  And so, 
I’m going to try and make this such that you care. 
Here’s the core idea that I want to suggest:  that one of the concerns that we have 
with conceptual art going forward, and with the question of copyrightability, is that 
copyright law, for a really long time now, has had a nascent and unstated theory of 
authorship that connects to the way in which we conceptualize the connection 
between inputs and outputs, agency in the real world, and the nature of the human 
connection to the work—and that these works of conceptual art are calling that theory 
into question.  And part of the concern is that this test and this conception, being 
unstated—when we take a step back to try and understand how we might update it 
or liberate it from these conceptions, we have a hard time wrestling with it, to nail it 
down.  And so, what I want to leave you with is the question of whether it’s time to 
update our traditional conception of authorship. 
But to do that, I want to start by saying that we do have a traditional conception 
of authorship hidden in plain sight.  Authorship, as we know, is not a doctrine that is 
well defined in copyright law, but it does a significant amount of analytical and 
doctrinal work.  The idea of authorship is in many ways embedded within other well-
worn doctrines of copyrightability:  within originality, within fixation in different 
ways, and very much within copyrightable subject matter.  So, it’s hiding in plain 
sight.  The rhetoric and the notion of authorship are doing a lot of analytical work in 
a variety of cases—certainly, I believe, in the way in which the Copyright Office 
approaches this, at least in my reading of parts of the Compendium. 
It’s diffused in significant portions of the Compendium, but I wanted to focus on 
one part of the Compendium where I think the notion of authorship plays a fairly 
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significant role in important, intuitive ways that are unstated and not fully 
expounded, which I want to explore.  Karyn Temple has already touched on provision 
313.2,1 which says a few different things that I want to highlight.  It says:  “To qualify 
as a work of ‘authorship’ a work must be created by a human being.”2  Also, that 
“[t]he Office will not register works produced by nature, animals, or plants.  
Likewise, the Office cannot register a work purportedly created by divine or 
supernatural beings”;3 and “[s]imilarly, the Office will not register works produced 
by a machine or mere mechanical process that operates randomly or automatically 
without any creative input or intervention from a human author.”4  Now, what I want 
to emphasize is that there’s nothing self-evident about the verbs used in these 
provisions, nor the nature of the connection between human agency and the product 
or the output that is seeking protection that they necessarily characterize.  Let me 
explain. 
In every copyright class, the discussion of authorship in some ways begins with 
the photograph Oscar Wilde, No. 18.  The case is Burrow-Giles v. Sarony,5 which in 
many ways was the first time the Supreme Court grappled with the notion of 
authorship—but through the doctrine of originality and the idea of writings in Article 
1, Section 8, clause 8.6  The Court, through the parties’ pleadings, has a nice, detailed 
description of what exactly it was that Napoleon Sarony did.  He posed Oscar Wilde 
in front of the camera, selected and arranged the costume, draperies, and other 
various accessories; arranged to present in a graceful outline, and so on.7  But what 
it does not mention is that Napoleon Sarony had a cameraman, standing about 
twenty-five feet away from him, who actually was operating the early-generation 
camera machine at the time.  So, Napoleon Sarony was not the cameraman.  He was 
orchestrating the entirety of it.  And the Court in some ways is aware of this, where 
it develops the standard of:  Okay, who is the author?  “[H]e to whom anything owes 
its origin; [the] originator; [the] maker; [or] one who completes a work.”8  And, 
drawing from an English case, the Court says the author is whoever is “the effective 
cause of” the creation.9  Hidden in that idea of creation, therefore, is an important 
causal dimension.  Now, I don’t have to say to all of you lawyers who’ve taken tort 
law, when we talk about proximate cause, and—I know, it brings back nightmares 
of the first year of law school—but, the open-endedness of the idea suggests that 
there are a variety of different connections between input and output that can qualify 
for the conclusion on “cause” that you’re looking for in a given case. 
And where does this come up?  Karyn already beat me to the punch.  Take a look 
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at the photograph at issue in the monkey selfie case—our good friend Naruto.10  On 
the face of things, if you didn’t know the narrative behind it, not much distinguishes 
that photograph from an actual wildlife photograph that appeared in the National 
Geographic magazine.11  Equally detailed in terms of capturing the monkey’s 
anatomical features of the face; the monkey’s facing the camera smiling in a 
similar—I would say, in a more expressive—way.  And I don’t think we would argue 
that the National Geographic photograph has serious authorship concerns or 
copyrightability concerns in terms of the way in which it was projected and actually 
produced.  But there’s something about the Naruto photograph.  It doesn’t have to 
do with what is manifest as mute testimony in the photograph itself.  It’s instead in 
the narrative of authorship behind the production of the photograph.  It’s because 
David Slater, the person who created it—I’m not going to say the person who 
authored it—produced a narrative saying that, “No, it really was produced by the 
monkey.  I went and spent these weeks getting to know Naruto and his family.  I 
befriended him and had him understand how the camera works, and then eventually 
I hid and let him hit the shutter button.”  But the answer underlying the 
copyrightability question there is a theory about what kind of human connection we 
deem sufficient for the purposes of our authorship.  The answer to why the 
photograph was not copyrightable as a subject of authorship was because the 
connection was deemed insufficient as a qualitative matter. 
And that, I think, is the key point here.  When we think about authorship, there is 
an important qualitative dimension between input and output, between human 
agency and the work, that we have to fully grapple with.  We have the intuitions that 
are embedded within copyright doctrine, and the new kinds of works—what Amelia 
Brankov and Regan Smith talked about12—are questioning some of these intuitions.  
So, we leave aside the ones that are firmly under the domain of originality or fixation.  
But cases like Kelley13 are really about questioning the connection between human 
agency and the actual output that is produced and is seeking protection.  The problem 
that we have is, in the absence of a clear doctrine to grapple with authorship, we’re 
doing the work through these other different concepts—originality or fixation. 
And so, the question that I have is a suggestion—this is my law professor hat—
that perhaps it’s time to rethink our traditional conception of authorship.  Perhaps it 
requires, in the Compendium, an actual section that says, “What does authorship 
mean?”—rather than “What is human authorship?” or a diffused conception of 
authorship that runs through different categories of works.  And, if so, then the 
question is:  Should we move away from what I would call an epistemic, or a real-
world idea of authorship, which is looking for tangible, external verification of this 
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connection?  That’s what’s really doing the work—can you show that there is a 
tangible connection between the human agent and what comes out at the end, such 
that it’s perhaps capable of being controlled, capable of being replicated into the 
future, and therefore capable of being protected?  Should we move away from that 
traditional conception and toward one that takes note of the way in which authorship 
and art are working—something of a far more intentionalist, conceptual domain, 
liberated from the traditional idea?  I’ll leave you with that question.  I look forward 
to the conversation.  Thank you very much. 
 
